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     1 The authors would like to thank the managers of the organisations, mentioned in this paper, for 
participating in this research. The people who provided us with an insight into the mailing industry have 
given a start to developing a body of Australian research on this issue. 
The three sectors of our economy are not unrelated enclaves. The state, nonprofit and for-profit sectors 
are constantly competing for power and resources. One only has to scratch the surface of state-church 
relations to reveal the naked struggle for political power over many centuries between that once all 
powerful nonprofit entity and the state. The struggle between for-profit interests and the state for 
power and resources is a popular point of reference for many scholars of the left. This struggle can be 
perceived in the nationalisation of whole industry and service sectors, as well as recent privatisations. 
This has also included many nonprofit enterprises. 
 
There has been a discernible trend in the United States of a recent struggle between for profit interests 
and nonprofit interests concerning competition for resources. The charge made by representatives of 
the for-profit lobby is that nonprofits are competing unfairly with for-profit in the same market place 
(US Small Business Administration [1988]). The root of the competitive advantage of the nonprofit 
sector is favoured treatment by the state. This treatment takes the form of comparatively lighter tax 
imposts and direct subsidies. 
 
The American academy has responded to this populist debate by generating substantial literature, often 
from a multi-disciplinary perspective, about the competition between the two sectors and the 
legitimacy of the favoured state treatment of the nonprofit sector. The popularist arguments have been 
subjected to rigorous academic scrutiny and several economic models have been developed to assess 
the impact of the competition. There has been little interest by the Australian academy, but the 
Australian state is showing indications of wishing to re-evaluate the role and position of the nonprofit 
sector in Australian society. 
 
The evidence for this is at present scant and anecdotal, being found in the perceived changing 
relationship of the state provision of direct welfare services and welfare organisations and the 
reluctance of government to extend or even maintain nonprofit fiscal privileges. The foreshadowed 
investigation of "charitable organisations" by the Industry Commission2
 
 may mark a watershed as the 
beginning of the serious public and academic debate in Australia as to the appropriateness of the 
favoured fiscal status of some of the nonprofit sector. A previous Commission investigation which 
touched on local government subsidies to the nonprofit sector and the present incomplete investigation 
into public housing provision indicate that a very serious attempt may be made to scrutinise the 
nonprofit sector's tax privileges and government subsidies. 
If the academy is to play a role in this process as the American academy has, then there is a large 
agenda in front of it. This paper is an initial offering to begin debate concerning these issues, it is the 
first in a series of case studies on nonprofit / for-profit competition. 3
 
 This paper examines the 
competition between nonprofit and for-profit entities in a small competitive market in south-east 
Queensland. The industry is mail production and packaging, commonly known as mail houses. The 
paper first identifies some of the major thrusts of American scholarship about the role of nonprofit 
entities in a commercial market. It then identifies some of the fiscal privileges enjoyed by sections of 
the Australian nonprofit sector. The paper then presents the case study of the mail house industry 
drawn from the perceptions of the participants. This material is then analysed and direction for further 
investigation are proposed. 
The American Debate 
 
Current literature in the United States documents a growing trend of nonprofit organisations engaging 
in commercial activities (Hansmann [1987]). Reduction in the availability of government subsidies has 
been suggested as a reason for this trend which has caused nonprofit organisations to turn to 
                                                 
2 The Industry Commission is a federal government statutory body which investigates and reports on the efficiency of 
industries selected by the government. On 20 September, 1992, it was announced by the Federal Treasurer that `charitable 
organisations' were to be placed on the commissions 1994 work plan. 
3 Other industries presently under consideration are child care and retirement villages. 
commercial activities in an attempt to cross subsidise their non-profit activities (Salamon, 
Musselwhite and Devita [1986], US Small Business Administration [1984], Schiff and Weisbrod 
[1991]). The resultant clouding of the distinction between for-profit and nonprofit organisations (Lifset 
[1988]) has raised a number of issues that potentially have significance for policy makers. The role of 
nonprofit organisations in the community and the benefits to the public arising from nonprofit 
organisations undertaking commercial activities have been questioned. Such questions appear related 
to fears that in competing for grants and revenues and relying less on donations nonprofits will lose 
sight of their main objective and invalidate their authenticity (Ferris and Grady [1989]). Other 
questions concerning the extent, fairness and efficiency of competition have also been raised due to the 
entry of tax exempt nonprofit organisations into industries where for-profit organisation compete (US 
Small Business Administration [1988], Weisbrod [1989]). More fundamentally, some authors question 
the legitimacy of extending the benefits made available to donative nonprofit organisations so as to 
capture their commercial activities4
 
 (Schiff and Weisbrod [1991], Hansmann [1987]).  
THE ROLE OF NONPROFIT ORGANISATIONS IN COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES 
 
Hansmann [1987] has suggested that an understanding of both the role and behaviour of nonprofit 
organisations is important in attempting to answer the issues surrounding their commercial 
activities.The general understanding of a nonprofit organisation is that it is an organisation which in 
conducting socially desirable functions is allowed to earn a surplus but is constrained in the 
distribution of those earnings. Residual earnings of a nonprofit organisation must be used only for its 
objects, this may include funding future ventures or be distributed to noncontrolling entities 5
 
 
(Hansmann [1987]).  
A crucial difference between competing nonprofit organisations and for-profit organisations is their 
objective. The objective of a for-profit organisation is profit maximisation whereas nonprofit 
organisations have been accredited with producing goods or services which either fulfils their main 
objective or cross subsidises it.  The characteristic features of a nonprofit have been described as an 
economic constraint and an ideology (Hansmann [1989], Ferris and Grady [1989]). 
 
There are many economic theories that consider the role of the nonprofit organisation. Of these there 
are a number of demand-based models that explain the existence of nonprofit organisations in 
commercial markets. The public goods theory proposed by Weisbrod [1988] originates from the 
concept that the government supplies public goods6
                                                 
4 In the US there is a unrelated business income tax which supposedly catches the commercial income of nonprofit 
organisations. However, Schiff and Weisbrod [1991] argue that application of this tax is difficult to enforce due the wide 
interpretation of related business income. 
 at a level that meets the demand of the median 
voter. Nonprofit organisations are viewed as arising to meet the excess demand for those public goods. 
Hansmann [1987] noted that although there was mild support for this model it failed to explain the 
production of private goods by commercial nonprofit organisations or why nonprofit organisations 
rather than for-profit organisations rose to meet this excess demand. Atkinson [1990] suggested that 
supply of public goods by nonprofits is preferred because patrons trust them to supply the product paid 
for. James [1987] argues that nonprofit organisations produce quasi-public goods and as such are in 
competition with the government on a production level. However on a financial level nonprofit 
organisations and the government are complementary in that the government subsidises the nonprofit 
organisations to enter the market to provide services in a less costly way than the government could in 
5 Residual earnings must only be used to further the objects of the association. These objects cannot be illegal or result in a 
pecuniary gain for the members or controllers of the organisation. 
6 A public good is a good which is able to be enjoyed by a number of people without limiting the ability of others to enjoy 
that good. The problem that arises with the provision of a public good is that once supplied it is available to everyone, 
whether they have paid for the good or not. This results in a free rider problem where individuals are unwilling to pay for 
the full value these goods and services. Hall and Colombo [1991] suggest that under classical economic theory, public 
goods are best supplied by the government as they are able to compel everyone to pay for the good through taxation. Where 
the government fails to meet the demand for the public good this is achieved through collective action, that is nonprofits 
form.  
meeting heterogeneous and excess demands. This may explain why nonprofit organisations would be 
successful over for-profit organisations in the production of quasi-public goods. The antithesis to this 
theory is the voluntary failure theory which suggests that nonprofit organisations arise in markets 
where for profit firms have failed to meet consumer demand (Salamon [1987]). 
 
An alternative theory, the contract failure theory suggests that nonprofit organisations enter markets as 
a policing mechanism which allows consumers to better measure the quality and quantity of the 
service provided. The reasoning is that, nonprofit organisations, due to their non-distribution 
constraint, are less likely to take advantage of patrons than are for-profit organisations who, because of 
their profit maximising objective, have the incentive to produce less for more (Hansmann [1987]). 
However, this theory has a number of weaknesses as it ignores the market for corporate control which, 
under agency theory, ensures that management of for-profit organisations will not act opportunistically 
and relies on the assumption that nonprofit organisations will provide better quality and quantity of 
service (Hansmann[1987]). Hansmann believed that these weaknesses could be overcome through the 
promulgation of organisational nonprofit law which would impose strict fiduciary standards on 
nonprofits. Ellman [1982] criticised Hansmann's interpretation of contract failure theory on the basis 
that Hansmann had failed to differentiate between the donative patron and the customer. He held that 
in doing so Hansmann had failed to discriminate between marginal impact monitoring7 which was the 
sole problem of the donative patron and the quality monitoring problem8
 
 which affected both the 
customer and the donative patron. Ellman [1982] believed that a more precise approach was necessary 
in the proposal of nonprofit legislature. 
Other demand theories are the subsidy theory and the consumer control theory. The subsidy theory 
suggests that competition between nonprofit organisations and for-profit organisations is the result of 
subsidies offered to the nonprofit organisations9
 
. The consumer control theory explains the existence 
of certain types of nonprofit organisations where patrons are attempting to prevent monopolistic 
exploitation. 
Supply based theories generally supplement demand based theories (Winkle [1990]) providing 
supposedly better explanations for why nonprofit organisations succeed and coexist with for-profit 
organisations in commercial markets. James [1987] developed a supply based theory to explain why 
nonprofit organisations develop and may succeed over for-profit organisations. It is reasoned that as it 
is difficult for nonprofit organisations to raise capital they generally enter labour intensive industries. 
Access to donations and lower labour costs allow them to provide goods and services at lower prices 
than for-profit organisations. 
 
Winkle [1990] devised a supply based model which took into consideration the relative power of 
various classes of actors in the market. This model held that besides having access to capital and 
entrepreneurship, classes of actors within an industry must have the power to mobilise the nonprofit 
sector. Government bodies and for profit firms must also have this power to be successful in an 
industry. Winkle [1990] questioned the validity of the government failure theory by suggesting that it 
was unlikely that one group would be able to succeed in an industry where another had failed. 
 
 
UNFAIR COMPETITION 
 
It would appear from the theories on the role of commercial nonprofit organisations that nonprofit 
organisations have some kind of advantage over for-profit organisations operating in the same 
industry. Each theory suggests some advantage nonprofit organisations have; customer trust, access to 
                                                 
7 Marginal impact monitoring involves being able to measure the added benefit arising from each dollar a patron donates. 
8 Quality monitoring is being able to measure the added quality provided by the nonprofit organisation in comparison to 
that provided by a for profit or governmental organisation. 
9 Hansmann [1985] (cited in Hansmann [1987]) provided some evidence that tax exemptions had a significant effect on the 
market share of non profit organisations as compared to for profit organisations.  
subsidies or lower production costs. Based on these theories it would seem reasonable to presume that 
nonprofit organisations have some competitive edge on for-profit organisations. In the US there are 
many arguments along this line, with small business resenting the advantage offered to their nonprofit 
competition (Weisbrod [1988], US Small Business Administration [1984]).  
 
However, this is not the view taken by many of the theorists on competition between for-profit 
organisation and nonprofit organisations. Rose-Ackermann [1988] holds that for-profit organisations 
and nonprofit organisations can coexist through the production of non-homogeneous goods and 
services for which each has a competitive advantage. That is, through the identification and adherence 
to their particular market niche. Based on the different objectives they assign to nonprofit 
organisations 10and for-profit organisations, Schiff and Weisbrod [1991] provide these alternative 
explanations for this coexistence: that the industry is not in long term equilibrium11
 
; that the nonprofit 
organisations are earning just enough to make it worth their while and the for-profit organisations earn 
approximately zero economic profits; or that in at least some of the industries for-profit organisations 
and nonprofit organisations are producing different products. 
Schiff and Weisbrod [1991] also argue that, the provision of tax exemptions to commercial nonprofit 
organisations does not result in unfair competition, but rather inefficiencies. They suggested that 
inefficiencies involving commercial activities and nonprofit activities could result from the tax 
advantages given to nonprofit organisations. Tax exemption on commercial activity could result in the 
government subsidising nonprofit organisations commercial activity with no external benefit. By 
allowing nonprofit organisations to have lower levels of production at lower prices, there is an 
opportunity for for-profit organisations to meet the excess demand at a higher price.  
 
The nonprofit activity inefficiency arises due to suboptimal allocation of subsidies to the exempt 
activities of the nonprofit organisation. The nonprofit organisation would benefit more from the tax 
exemptions the greater their involvement in commercial activity. Given the assumption of cross 
subsidisation, it is possible that the tax advantages are allocated to activities for which there may be no 
public benefit, rather than to the nonprofit activities the main purpose for which the organisation 
exists. Schiff and Weisbrod [1991] conclude that a more efficient allocation would result from the 
government subsidising the charitable output directly rather than subsidising the commercial activities 
through tax advantages. 
 
Weisbrod [1988], did however, hold the view that certain activities merit subsidisation12
 
 through 
nonprofit organisations and as such competition between subsidised nonprofit organisations and 
nonsubsidised for-profit organisation was efficient. Hansmann [1987] though, questioned the 
legitimacy of the provision of tax advantages to the commercial activities of nonprofit organisations 
arguing that it is difficult to rationalise the tax exemptions for nonprofit organisations on the basis that 
they provide a service worthy of subsidisation in general. Such an argument suggests that for-profit 
organisations providing the same service should also be subsidised. Hansmann [1987] states that 
arguments that the nondistribution constraint ensures that any advantage is passed on to the customer 
can be refuted by allusion to the fact that the existence of competition among firms generally would 
also ensure that any benefits provided to for-profit organisations would also be distributed to 
consumers. 
Australian Taxation Benefits and Subsidies 
 
                                                 
10 Schiff and Weisbrod [1991] assume that nonprofit organisations undertake commercial activities to cross subsidise their 
non-profit activities. As such, the utility of the managers of nonprofit organisations is increased by the production of 
nonprofit activities and reduced by the production of commercial outputs. Thus there is little incentive for nonprofit 
organisations to meet consumer demand. 
11 If an industry was in equilibrium, Schiff and Weisbrod [1988] argue that it would either be dominated by tax exempt 
nonprofit organisations or by for profit organisations. 
12 An example, given by Weisbrod, was markets where there may be a barrier to entry. 
The three tiers of Australian government being the Federal government, the states and territories and 
local governments all levy financial imposts on the community. The Federal government is the largest 
tax gatherer imposing income tax, sales tax and capital gains tax on the Australian public.13
 
 States 
impose a range of subsidiary taxes such as land tax, payroll tax, stamp duty and licence fees. Local 
government taxes are usually confined to rates and service charges. All three levels of government also 
provide various subsidies to nonprofit organisations. 
As each taxation or subsidy statute has a unique definition of nonprofit entities that are exempted from 
the particular impost, it is beyond the scope of this work to even begin to attempt a classification of 
which bodies exemptions and subsidies apply to. The Federal legislation contains 72 different 
definitions of the word "charitable" when referring to exemptions and this is exponentially cloned in 
differing state legislation. It would appear to be one of the important tasks of the academy to chart and 
classify all of the different definitions of nonprofit entities that are exempted from various pieces of 
legislation. 
 
One of the most important taxation benefits available to a large number of "charity" nonprofits is 
Section 23 of the Income Tax Assessment Act. This section relieves organisations from paying income 
tax on any income however derived. There is no equivalent of the American Unrelated Business Tax 
and it is far wider than the English taxation exemptions. There are many nonprofit organisations in 
Australia that operate purely commercial divisions that have very little to do with their objects apart 
from financially cross subsiding them. These include chains of book shops, cereal manufacturers, hot 
bread kitchens, record shops and even large wheat farms. 
 
Compared to the scrutiny given to the American 990 Internal Revenue Service forms the 
administrative regulation of the taxation exemption is very minimal. Many Australian nonprofit 
organisation who do not appear to have taxation exemption still do not even lodge a taxation return 
and there are little practical consequences of this breach of the law. 
                                                 
13 Depending on the outcome of a Federal election in March, 1993, this tax mix could alter with the introduction of a broad 
based goods and services tax. 
 
TABLE 1 
Major Benefits available to Australian nonprofit organisations 
 
Benefit Description 
Income Tax Charitable institutions exempt under s23 of Income Tax Assessment 
Act (ITAA). Special rates for non-exempt nonprofit organisations. 
Section 78 allows donors to claim donations of over $2.00 to 
specified organisations as taxable deductions against their assessable 
income. 
Tax File Numbers Exempt charities not required to quote a Tax File Number to ensure 
exemption. 
Deductibility of Donations Donations made to public benevolent institutions may be deductible 
to the donor under s78 of the ITAA. 
Training Guarantee Levy Public benevolent institutions are excepted from spending 1.5% of 
their annual national payroll on training. 
Sales Tax Goods for use by public benevolent bodies and other nonprofit 
organisations are exempt from sales tax. 
Bank Accounts Debits Tax Exempt 
Payroll Tax Schools up to and including secondary level and institutions which 
relieve poverty, care for the sick, aged, infirm or incorrigible persons 
are exempt. Payroll Tax only applies to annual wages in excess of 
$600,000. 
Stamp Duty Exemptions for qualifying institutions. 
Fringe Benefits Tax Exemptions for employment of employees in public benevolent 
institutions. 
Local Council Rates Exemptions for land used for the purposes of public charities. 
Land Tax Exempts land owned by nonprofit charitable institutions carried on 
solely for charitable purposes. 
Corporate Affairs Lodging Fees Reduction in annual return fees for charity companies. 
Other There are other exemptions and reductions in fees etc, that are 
provided to nonprofit organisations but these tend to be specific to 
the industry the nonprofit organisation is operating in, for example 
there are certain industries in which only nonprofits are allowed to 
operate such as art unions, large scale poker machine operations. 
RESEARCH METHOD 
 
The research undertaken in this paper is exploratory in nature. Interviews conducted were designed to 
obtain participants differing perceptions of the industryi
 
. A number of reasons led to the selection of 
the mailing industry for a case study. There was little government participation in the industry, a clear 
delineation between nonprofit and for-profit firms existed, and a small population. 
The focus of the research was the private nonprofit sector. Within this group the research has centred 
on organisations which compete in the mailing industry. A purposive sample was used in conducting 
this research.  The sample selected is listed below: 
 
 Security Mailing   QM Industries 
 Hermes Precisa Australia  Nitefold 
 Endeavour Foundation  Unicare 
 Red Cross 
 
 
The advantage in using such a sample is that it was possible to choose the major participants in the 
market. 
 
Black and Champion (1976, p.306-307) believe judgemental samples are most useful where errors in 
selecting elements will not seriously effect the research objectives. As the research is attempting to 
develop directions for future research, a judgemental sample is less likely to effect the research 
objective. 
 
Limitations of this research 
 
A limitation of this study was the use of interviewee's perceptions and the possibility of bias in the 
researcher's interpretation. However our understanding of the structure and operations of the mailing 
industry in Brisbane was examined by one of the large for-profit firms and found to be accurate, in 
their opinion. 
 
This research was conducted in an Australian capital city, Brisbane, thus any findings are limited to 
this geographic location. It is possible that in different locations, for example smaller country towns, 
such findings may be different because of the size of the market, and the strength of the participants. 
 
As competitive forces are dynamic over time the findings of this study, which illustrate current 
competition in the mailing industry, may be unable to be used to predict future developments in the 
industry. 
 
HISTORY OF THE MAIL HOUSE INDUSTRY 
 
A mailing house is a firm that processes mailing articles and outputs them in a form which gains the 
greatest discount from Australia Post. The organisations interviewed performed many operations 
mainly based around creating value-added service to their mailing division. 
 
The original mailing house in Brisbane was The Endeavour Foundation (nonprofit organisation). With 
the growth in direct marketing, in particular direct mail, the industry grew rapidly with new entrants 
coming from both the nonprofit and the for-profit sector. The original participant's profit came not 
from profit-margins on service provided but rather from retaining a portion of the bulk mailing 
discount obtained from Australia Post. As competition increased, due to new entrants, firms could not 
justify retaining the mailing discount and were compelled to pass on all discounts to the customer. 
Because of good market information about processing costs, firms found it difficult to increase profit 
margins on their services. Thus the market for mailing services was firstly based on price competition, 
and only then on quality and timeliness. 
 
Such competition forced for-profit operators to gain more efficiency out of their mailing operations by 
investing in new technology (capital equipment) that lowered the cost per unit, and thus increased their 
profit per unit. This profit advantage was only short lived for as soon as one for-profit gained a 
competitive advantage, the other for-profit competitors immediately adopted the new technology. 
Having no control over suppliers of the new technologies also allowed large customers (for example 
the Brisbane City Council) to develop their own in-house mailing services. It is possible that these 
once mail house customers will become part-time competitors attempting to use their surplus capacity, 
again increasing rivalry in the mailing industry. 
 
The for-profit firms were forced to develop value-added services (laser printing services, database 
marketing) in an attempt to differentiate their product between themselves, and obtain a premium 
price. Again such advancements by one firm were easily copied by their competitors and eventually 
the market returned to price based competition. These new services were based on adopting new 
technology, which required capital investment, employment of specialised staff and training of 
existing staff, and a change in work practices.  
 
The motivation of being able to obtain a premium price has not been evident in the non-profit sector. 
This combined with their altruistic objectives has seen nonprofit firms in the mailing industry virtually 
remain the same, even though the market has become more price competitive and customers have 
become more powerful. 
 
At present the mailing industry in Brisbane appears to be in a stable state. The nonprofit firms 
concentrate mainly on small `hand-line work'14 which the for-profit firms find a `nuisance'15. Their 
limitations in capital and labour causes any large hand-line work to go to the for-profit operators. 
While the nonprofit organisations do some mechanical inserting, any large jobs are done by the 
for-profit organisations. This is well illustrated by the Endeavour Foundation contracting out their Art 
Union mailing rather then doing it inhouse16
 
. Both nonprofits and for-profits are satisfied with the 
industry structure with neither believing they compete with each other. Both parties fulfil the differing 
needs of the community while also meeting their own objectives. 
In 1992 the Federal government introduced changes to the Disability Services Act 1986. The 
amendments are aimed at making nonprofit service providers, such as nonprofit mail houses, more 
`business-like' by adopting a factory model, that is productivity-based wages, normal working 
conditions, and a high community profile. The effects of these amendments are yet to be seen in the 
mailing industry. 
 
 
THE ROLE OF NONPROFIT ORGANISATIONS IN THE MAILING INDUSTRY 
 
The literature has presented economic theories which are used to describe nonprofit organisations 
conducting for-profit operations. However such economic analysis to define the role and function of 
the nonprofit sector ignores the traditional mission of the nonprofit sector. Such theories propose that: 
                                                 
14 Hand-line work relies on hand insertion of materials into envelopes or packages. 
15 If a job is described as a nuisance by a for-profit firm then they simply mean that such a job is unprofitable. 
16 Nonprofit organisations contribute considerably to the work of the for-profit mailing houses, the largest mailer in 
Queensland being the Boystown Art Union. This may be another reason why the nonprofit mailing houses are so well 
received in this commercial activity. 
 
The individual nonprofit exists only to the extent that there are market forces sufficient to generate a 
corresponding organizational response designed to fill what is a market generated need. Altruism, 
compassion, charity, and philanthropy, to the extent they exist, are viewed as secondary elements 
in the generation of third sector institutions and organisations. Bush [1992, p.398] 
 
The mission of nonprofit mailing divisions in this research was to provide training for people who 
were intellectually disadvantaged so that they are able to gain employment in the private or 
public sector. Secondary to this mission was the need for the division to break-even. If the demand 
theories already presented are to hold any sway then it could be expected that as the market changed, 
nonprofit organisations would have also changed its product, price, distribution, and promotion in an 
attempt to maintain market share. This has not been the case in the mailing industry. 
 
This research does give limited support to a supply based economic theory on why nonprofit 
organisations coexist with for-profit organisations in commercial markets. The nonprofit organisations 
in the mailing industry entered the market because it was labour intensive. However the reason was 
not because they had difficulty raising capital but rather because being labour intensive, and relatively 
simple repetitive work, helped the nonprofit organisation meet its objectives.17
 
 And it would appear 
that while the nonprofit organisation is meeting its primary objective it will remain in the industry. 
This supports Hansmann [1989, p.92] in his belief that nonprofit firms operate with considerable 
efficiency when faced with financial stringency and hence cannot easily be driven out of business 
simply through competition from for-profit firms. 
 
PERCEIVED ADVANTAGES BY NONPROFIT OPERATORS 
 
While it may be possible for nonprofit organisations to receive considerable tax benefits, the nonprofit 
mailing houses take little advantage of these concessions due to their very nature. Exemption from 
federal tax on income is of little benefit as in all cases expenses were matched to income. If it appeared 
that the division would make a surplus in any period, more staff were employed. Any surplus was 
small and in most years the mail house divisions broke even or were cross subsidised by other 
divisions within then organisation. Payroll tax exemption only effects those nonprofits with payroll 
over $600,000, sales tax exemption would be advantageous if these nonprofit organisations were 
buying  capital equipment, and the notion that customers give work to nonprofits because of their 
altruistic objectives belongs with the myth that computer technology will reduce bureaucratic 
expansion. There are minor financial advantages available to nonprofit organisations in the areas of car 
registration, superannuation, and obtaining government buying prices (state store prices); however it 
would appear that these are heavily outweighed by the disadvantages of being a nonprofit organisation. 
Being restrained by their organisational rules restricts them in raising capital, being unable to extend 
work shifts (operating 24 hours), lack of responsibility by workers, and lack of business drive threaten 
the survival of some nonprofit mailing houses. 
 
 
UNFAIR COMPETITION IN THE MAILING INDUSTRY 
 
At present, competition in the mailing industry is based on price. While some operators maintain that 
they provide superior service or quicker delivery time, there is clear evidence to show that it is mere 
wishful thinking by management that customers see this as more than secondary to price. Any 
competitive advantage gained in the area of customer service is short lived and is quickly adopted by 
competitors. 
 
                                                 
17 If the supply based theory was held then it would be expected that as the mailing industry became more capital intensive 
then nonprofit organisations would have moved to a more labour intensive industry. 
Competition occurs within two major niches; large and small jobs (either mechanical insertion or hand 
line work). Coincidently the for-profits base themselves around the large jobs and the nonprofits 
around the small jobs 18 . While there is fierce competition within the two groups there is little 
competition between the groups. Interestingly price in both niches is not set by costs plus a margin, but 
rather at what the market is prepared to pay. Thus an organisation may lose on certain jobs because it 
has to pay overtime rates and casual labor to complete a job on time. This illustrates the strength of the 
customer19
 
, and the misguided belief that customer loyalty is prevalent. In price competition the 
customer is very loyal to the price of the product. 
Nonprofit firms interviewed maintained that they merely broke-even each year. If any profit was made 
then more people with disabilities would be employed or if a loss was forecasted then some workers 
would be layed-off. There was no cross-subsidisation by the mailing house division to other divisions, 
in fact in some nonprofits the mailing house division was often cross-subsidised by other divisions. 
 
This research supports Rose-Ackermann [1988] and Schiff and Weisbrod [1991] in their view that 
unfair competition often does not arise because each sector adheres to their particular niche where they 
have a competitive advantage. When this occurs the community is not only receiving the economic 
benefits of an efficient industry but also the social welfare benefits of the nonprofit organisations 
meeting their objectives. The notion of nonprofit mailing houses being inefficient because of tax 
advantages and government subsidies is secondary to the fact that these organisations desire to be 
inefficient to achieve their organisational objective. By out-placing their most efficient employees they 
are willfully being inefficient in their commercial activities. An organisational objective, supported by 
the community, which forces the nonprofit to be inefficient has not been widely addressed by current 
literature. The economic arguments of American academics have been based on models where the 
nonprofit organisation has an objective of profit making, when a nonprofit business lacks this 
objective the models become invalid and meaningless.  
 
 
FUTURE COMPETITION IN THE MAILING INDUSTRY 
 
The `large job' mail market, dominated by for-profit organisations, is threatened by large buyers 
developing their own in-house services. Since there is no restrictions on suppliers selling their 
equipment, any mailing house customer can immediately acquire the latest technology.20 The buyers 
participating in such activity are mainly from the public sector, which while being nonprofit, they are 
outside the scope of this report. Another threat to this market is the entrance of Australia Post21. The 
government authority is targeting large national mailers, such as the Commonwealth Bank, offering 
lower costs.22
 
 The for-profit sector do not perceive Australia Post as a threat because they believe 
Australia Post can not compete with their customer service.  
The new Disability Services Act may have a profound impact on the nonprofit mail houses. It is 
perceived by the nonprofit organisations interviewed that because of productivity-based wages, 
including a minimum wage, that breaking-even financially will become increasingly difficult. There is 
expected to be a significant increase in the cost of production in the nonprofit sector. There are five 
                                                 
18 While there are some for-profit operators in the small jobs market they exist on the fringe and are mainly geographically 
based and compete on this. The question is whether the mere fact that nonprofit organisation maintain a strong position in 
the `small jobs' market discourages other organisations from entering the market. 
19 The reason for strong buyer power is because of low switching costs, high buyer information, and the product is 
increasingly being regarded as a commodity. See Porter [1985] and Day [1990] for strategies to combat these competitive 
forces. 
20 Suppliers of mailing house capital equipment are trying to expand their own market by targeting large customers of 
mailing houses. 
21 Australia Post is a Federal Government statutory body which has the sole right to distribute mail within Australia. Such a 
monopoly is at present under attack, because of government rationalisations. 
22 The lower costs are possible through the transfer of information via computer networks and the printing of that 
information at the closest capital city to the postal address. 
possible solutions: 
 
1. change organisation structure (increase efficiency through economies of scale); 
2. increase productivity to lower cost per unit output (increase efficiency 
with a given scale); 
 3. increase prices to maintain break-even point; 
 4. move into another industry; 
 5. or subsidise the mail house division. 
 
The first possibility is very real to many nonprofit service providers. The National Technical 
Assistance Unit (NTAU) 23  expressed that many nonprofit service providers will have difficulty 
surviving expected changes in the industry without altering their organisational structure. It was 
implied that in many cases that cooperation between presently competing nonprofits was the key to 
their survival.24
 
 
Increasing productivity seems an obvious alternative. This could be done by capital investment in 
more modern technology or increased use of more skilled labour. Both propositions leads the nonprofit 
further from its objective and closer to competing against the for-profit organisations. The objective of 
the increased efficiency is not being to lower costs but rather to maintain them at the current level. 
 
The third solution, nonprofit organisations (as a group) increase their prices to maintain break-even, is 
not a valid answer. At a higher price the for-profit firms may not consider the `small job' market so 
unattractive. It is also likely that the nonprofit firms themselves would be tempted into price-cutting 
tactics to maintain their previous production levels and continue to meet the divisions disadvantaged 
employment level objectives25. Such a solution assumes that the nonprofit mail houses are the only 
suppliers to the market26
 
 and revenue will increase as a result of the price increase. Such assumptions 
are invalid. 
Moving to another industry which provided better returns is unlikely. While financial resources may 
become scarcer and threaten the survival of many nonprofit mailing houses, we agree with Hansmann 
[1989] that difficulty in transfering capital to another industry, and management's stake in retaining the 
nonprofit in the mailing industry, will see the survival of the nonprofit mail houses. 
 
The final solution of providing or increasing subsidisation to the mailing division is a difficult 
proposition which will be faced by some nonprofit boards. If one assumes that prior to these increased 
demands from the mailing house division the nonprofit organisation distributed their funds efficiently, 
then by increasing subsidisation to the mailing division is the organisation less efficient in meeting its 
objectives? 
 
It is likely that there will be a combination of the propositions of increased efficiency and 
cross-subsidisation with the outcome being the `small job' market will see little change in its 
structure27
                                                 
23 The NTAU was set up by the Federal Government in 1992. The aim of the unit is to provide high-quality technical 
assistance, advice, support and training to sheltered workshops such that consumers will achieve measurable positive 
outcomes. 
. That is competition between nonprofit and for-profit organisations will continue to be 
negligible in the mailing house industry. However to maintain this market structure the nonprofit mail 
24 Program on Nonprofit Corporations Seminar Series, Queensland University of Technology, November, 1992. 
25 Price cutting is already practiced by certain nonprofits, it is fair to assume that such a practice would increase as 
commercial pressure escalates. Of course this will cause a escalating effect which should be avoided at all costs, however 
without some collusion it appears inevitable. 
26 Although their is little competition between nonprofit and for-profit firms there would be considerable competition 
between nonprofit firms and potential clients who choose to perform the work inhouse. 
27 The authors do believe that individual nonprofits in the market will experience an unstable environment and that some 
nonprofit divisions may face extinction, however the `small job' market as a whole will remain stable. 
houses will have to lower their divisional goals, and the quest of becoming more `business-like' may 
endanger the traditional spirit of the organisation. 
 
As business practices and interest in efficiency come to dominate nonprofit thinking and action, 
more people may slip through the cracks of the so-called social safety net. [Bush, 1992, p.393] 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This research has shown that providing tax benefits and subsidies to the nonprofit sector does not 
necessarily create an environment which encourages unfair competition, it may however discourage 
competition by increasing the barriers to entry for other organisations. Where there appears to be direct 
competition between the for-profit sector and the nonprofit sector then there must at least be an 
attempt to measure the trade-off between the economic rational model and other outcomes for society 
such as the training of intellectually disabled people. The community should be aware of 
organisational objectives apart from producing the least cost product. 
 
In attempting to explain the mail house environment this paper first examined economic models. No 
one specific model explains the business activity in the nonprofit mail houses. This is not a criticism of 
the academic literature, but rather an example of the perplexing nonprofit environment. Lohmann 
[1989] attacks existing economic and financial theories of nonprofit organisations for assuming that all 
nonprofit activity is somehow a deviant form of commercial enterprise. However this research has 
shown that participants in the nonprofit mail house industry have pursued a strategy that has lead them 
to developing their own niche, away from the for-profit operators.28
 
 Perhaps this is indicative of a 
need for nonprofit organisations to choose between various aspects of the for-profit marketing model 
in order to meet their objectives. For example, for a nonprofit organisation to run a successful cross 
subsidising division, it may be necessary to adopt for-profit marketing techniques. This permits them 
to concentrate on the `bottom line' and compete successfully with for-profit and nonprofit competitors. 
If the nonprofit organisation has mixed objectives, then it may be necessary to alter the model to serve 
it objects which are only partly for-profit and partly for other objectives. The challenge that faces 
nonprofit managers is to define or redefine the present strategies and processes. When applying 
economic models to a nonprofit industry it is not only the environment which governs their aptness but 
also the objectives of each individual organisation.  
The findings of this research suggest that modelling the nonprofit sector is cumbersome. Thus for 
appropriate policy decisions to be made, considerably more research is required by the Australian 
academy into competition between for-profit and nonprofit organisations. The difficulty faced by 
researchers is the lack of base data compared to that available to American researchers through the 
Internal Revenue Service. 
 
It is presently impossible to replicate the intricate American economic models (for example, Schiff & 
Weisbrod [1991]) in Australia, as they use aggregated data from sources such as the Internal Revenue 
Service. In Australia the taxation authorities can not, by law, release such information and it is 
suspected that they do not have the appropriate information in any case. There is no other source at 
present of such aggregated data across the spectrum of nonprofit organisations in Australia, nor is 
there likely to be in the near future. It is even difficult obtaining accurate specific industry data in 
Australia of for-profit organisations which are reluctant to release sensitive commercial information. 
Nonprofit divisions often have very basic accounting procedures which are not refined enough to 
provide an accurate picture of their financial status. 
 
Given these constraints it appears that Australian research into the area of competition between 
                                                 
28 That the strategy required them to remain the same is not important. And having to take this strategy to fulfil their 
objectives is very similar to a for-profit firm adopting strategies to meet their objectives. 
for-profit and nonprofit organisations may well be confined for a period to case studies. It may be 
possible by examining industries that have particular attributes to gradually build a broader picture of 
the interaction of nonprofit, for-profit and state competition for resources in commercial markets and 
the role of state taxation exemptions and subsidies. Public policy made without firm research into the 
actual state of competition between the sector is likely at best to be an educated guess. 
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